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Abstract 
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from 
various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty 
shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the 
entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking 
first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from 
random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are 
not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data 
selection might lead to non-representative findings. 
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A recent paper by Jose Apesteguia and Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming; in the 
following APH) reports a systematic and significant first-mover advantage in soccer penalty 
shootouts. As APH convincingly argue, soccer penalty shootouts are an important example 
for the consequences of a puzzling psychological bias in sequential tournaments. More 
specifically, they say that their “results provide support for a source of psychological pressure 
that has a detrimental effect on performance, and that is different from others such as high 
stakes, social pressure or peer pressure previously documented in the literature” (p. 15f. of the 
accepted manuscript). 
APH have collected data on penalty shootouts from ten different national and international 
competitions (World Cup, Continental Cups, National Cups). Based on their collection of 129 
shootouts, APH show that the first-kicking teams win in 78 cases (60.5%), and lose only in 51 
cases (p = 0.022; two-sided Binomial test), despite the a priori probability of both teams 
winning with a 50% chance. APH ascribe this very strong and significant effect of sequential 
moves in a tournament to psychological pressure on the second-kicking teams, because they 
typically face an intermediate score in the shootout that is to their disadvantage when kicking. 
The striking findings of APH are at odds with the results of an earlier publication of ours. 
In Martin G. Kocher, Marc V. Lenz and Matthias Sutter (2008) we examined the determinants 
of scoring in penalty shootouts in the German DFB-Pokal (German Soccer Cup Competition), 
but our focus in that paper was not on a possible first-mover advantage. Nevertheless, for a 
preliminary data set of 95 easily accessible penalty shootouts in the seasons from 1986/1987 
to 2006/2007 we found that the first-kicking teams won in only 48.4% of cases. This was not 
significantly different from the expected 50%, and hence different from the more recent 
results of APH. 
Intrigued by this inconsistency and interested in providing a robustness test of APH’s 
results, we considerably extended our data set by collecting data from six major competitions 
and the penalty shootouts therein from 1970 onwards. First, we collected data for the entire 
history of the German Soccer Cup Competition, which ranks among Europe’s most important 
soccer competitions. Then we gathered data on the three most important European-level club 
competitions (and their predecessors), i.e., the European Champions League, the UEFA Cup, 
and the European Cup Winners’ Cup. Finally, we took shootouts from the two most important 
soccer events in the world, the European Championship and the World Cup, both of which are 
competitions for national teams. 
Our approach regarding data collection is different from the one used by APH. We 
collected data for the entire history of six major competitions. APH consider more 
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competitions (ten), but they select subsamples of each competition that belong to different 
time periods (see their Table 1). While APH take into account (almost) all shootouts in 
competitions of national teams (i.e., World Cup, European Championship, American Cup, 
African Nations Cup, Gold Cup), the time periods that they chose for the various club 
competitions do not reveal a systematic pattern or rule for inclusion. For the Champions 
League and the UEFA Cup, they consider the years 2000-2003 plus all finals. For the Spanish 
Cup they use data from 1999 to 2003, and all prior finals. For the German Cups (German 
Soccer Cup Competition and German Supercup) they take the years 2001-2003 as well as all 
prior finals. Finally, for the English Cups their paper lacks information on the years being 
taken into account. 
For the six competitions that we consider, we have data for 262 shootouts that took place 
from 1970 to June 2003. In restricting our dataset to shootouts before summer 2003 we follow 
the convincing argument of APH that only until then shootout data can be used for an 
unbiased examination of a potential first-mover advantage (see section 1 below for details)., 
Of the 262 shootouts that we consider, the first-kicking teams won a total of 140. The relative 
frequency of 53.4% is by far not significantly different from the a priori expected probability 
of 50% (p = 0.29; two-sided Binomial test). Hence, the results of APH are not generally 
robust, and the seemingly minor detail of which time period to consider makes a big 
difference for finding a first-mover advantage or not. 
The rest of the comment is organized as follows. In section 1 we describe our data set, the 
sources we used and the rules that determine which team kicks first in a penalty shootout. 
Section 2 presents our results, and section 3 concludes. 
 
1. Rules and Data 
Penalty shootouts were introduced by the world governing body of soccer, the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1970 to determine the winner in knock-out 
tournament games in which there was a tie between two teams after 90 minutes of regular 
time and 30 minutes of overtime. Before 1970, the winner in tied games in a knock-out 
tournament was determined by the draw of a lot. 
The basic rules for a penalty shootout are as follows (for details see the official “Rules of 
the Game” at www.fifa.com): First, each team selects five players (out of the players on the 
pitch in the 120th minute). Second, teams kick in alternating order. Third, the shootout is 
terminated as soon as the number of penalties converted by one team cannot be matched by 
the other team. If – after both teams have taken five kicks – both have scored the same 
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number of goals, teams continue kicking in the same alternating order until one team has 
scored a goal more than the other from the same number of kicks (i.e., in a one-on-one 
competition). Each penalty kick during the shootout must be taken by a different player, and 
all eligible players must take a kick before any player can take a second kick. In principle, this 
sequence can go on infinitely. However, the longest shootout in our data set includes 26 kicks, 
i.e., 13 for each team.1 
From 1970 until June 2003 the first-kicking team was the team that won the referee’s toss 
of a coin before the shootout. Such a rule constitutes an explicit randomization to determine 
the beginning team.2 In July 2003, the FIFA changed the rules slightly by giving the winner of 
the referee’s toss of a coin the option of choosing whether to kick first or second. This choice 
option may give rise to endogeneity problems, and therefore we only use data for 1970 to 
June 2003 (i.e., the end of the season 2002/2003). 
Our data of the shootouts in the German Soccer Cup Competition have been retrieved by 
resorting to the print and online editions of Kicker Sportmagazin, the most important 
magazine for German football (see www.kicker.de), the online data archive 
www.fussballdaten.de, and in a few cases by calling clubs’ headquarters. In total, we were 
able to collect the relevant data for 105 out of a total of 115 shootouts in the entire period 
from 1970 to June 2003. We are missing details on the order of kicking in ten shootouts in the 
1970s and 1980s because, due to professional printers being on strike, the Kicker 
Sportmagazin was forced to distribute some incomplete issues, and it was impossible to find 
other sources for the order of kicking in the ten cases. 
The data for the European Champions League (and its predecessor, the European 
Champion Clubs’ Cup), the UEFA Cup (and its predecessor, the European Fairs Cup), and the 
European Cup Winners’ Cup (which ceased to be played out in 1999) were taken from 
Ionescu (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e). In total, there were 138 shootouts in 
                                                 
1 A soccer penalty shootout belongs to a class of games that Mark Walker, John Wooders, and Rabah Amir 
(2009) call binary Markov games. For a theoretical account of such games, see their paper. Penalty shootouts are 
a good example for studying mixed strategies in games (see Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Steven Levitt and Timothy 
Groseclose, 2002). Consequently, soccer players – because of their penalty shooting experience – have been 
used to examine mixed strategy play of professionals in the laboratory (see Palacios-Huerta and Oscar Volij, 
2008; Levitt, John List and David Reiley, forthcoming; Wooders, forthcoming). 
2 In the terminology of Glenn Harrison and List (2004) this rule constitutes a truly randomized natural 
experiment. 
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these three club competitions on the European level from 1970 to June 2003, and we were 
able to find data on the kicking order for 132 shootouts. 
For the World Cup and the European Championship we collected the necessary data for 
all 25 shootouts that ever took place in these competitions from 1970 to 2002. Sources were 
the Kicker Sportmagazin, www.fifa.com, and www.fussballdaten.de. 
 
2. Results 
Table 1 presents the data for all six competitions. The first column shows the number of 
shootouts for which we have data. The second column indicates the relative frequency with 
which the first-kicking teams won the shootout in the relevant competition. The third column 
reports the p-value from a two-sided Binomial test that examines whether the observed 
relative frequency of first-kicking teams winning the shootout is significantly different from 
50%. 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 
 
For none of the six competitions we find a significant first-mover advantage. The relative 
frequency with which the first-kicking teams win the shootout varies from 33% in the 
European Championship to 63% in the Champions League. If we pool all data (see final row 
of Table 1), the Binomial test gives a p-value of 0.29 for our sample of 262 shootouts. 
If we exclude the data from the German Soccer Cup Competition – and therefore 
concentrate exclusively on the international competitions – the p-value of the Binomial test is 
0.26 (N = 157), showing clearly that our null-result is not driven by the German data. It is 
noteworthy that World Cups and European Championships are also included in the data set of 
APH, but they do not report separate statistics for them. Hence, the main result established in 
APH is not driven by these high-stakes competitions, either. If psychological pressure is at all 
strong in penalty shootout situations, it must be strongest in these competitions, as they attract 
the most public attention and media coverage, and they are of the utmost importance for the 
standing and career prospect of every kicker on the pitch. However, out of the 25 shootouts in 
the World Cup and the European Championship before 2003, only ten were won by the first-
kicking team.3 
                                                 
3 For a paper addressing the influence of incentives on experimental laboratory behavior see Dan Ariely, Uri 
Gneezy, George Loewenstein, and Nina Mazar (2009). 
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Figure 1 presents the relative frequency of the first-kicking teams winning and the number 
of shootouts in all seasons from 1970/1971 (denoted 1970 in Figure 1) to 2002/2003 (denoted 
2002).4 According to a Binomial test, the relative frequency of first-kicking teams to win the 
shootout is not significantly different from 50% in any single year. From Figure 1 it becomes 
clear that the relative frequency with which first-kicking teams win the shootout is larger than 
50% in 12 seasons, and smaller than 50% in another 12 seasons.5 
 
3. Conclusion 
Penalty shootouts from 1970 until June 2003 constitute a truly randomized experiment. 
Taking a look at the influence of the order of kicking on the probability of winning allows 
studying a possible first-mover advantage that might be due to psychological pressure on the 
team that kicks second. Considering the whole history of six major competitions (the World 
Cup, the European Championship, the European Champions League, the UEFA-Cup, the 
European Cup Winners’ Cup, and the German Soccer Cup Competition), we did not find 
significant evidence of a first-mover advantage. Considering all 262 shootouts from 1970 to 
June 2003 the first-kicking teams won in 53.4% of cases, which is not significantly different 
from the expected a priori probability of 50%. Likewise, none of the six competitions 
separately yields a result that is statistically different from 50%, nor do we find a single year 
in which first-kicking teams win significantly more often than second-kicking teams. Hence, 
our findings are in marked contrast to the results presented by Apesteguia and Palacios-
Huerta (forthcoming), who report that first-kicking teams win significantly more often than a 
                                                 
4 The World Cups and European Championships take place every four years, typically from June to early 
July. These competitions are then regarded as the end of a season. Therefore, the World Cup 2002 is part of the 
season 2001/2002, showing up in the bar “2001” in Figure 1. The number of shootouts is generally smaller in the 
1970s and 1980s due to a change in rules in the German Soccer Cup Competition. Prior to 1991 the rules 
stipulated to play a second match (in the other team’s stadium) if a match ended with a draw after 120 minutes. 
Only if there was again a draw after 120 minutes in the second leg, a penalty shootout had to determine the 
winner. From 1991 on, the possibility of a second match was abolished and each cup match had to be decided in 
a shootout if it was tied after 120 minutes. 
5 A randomized binomial test (see Wooders, 2008, for details how to calculate it) cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the first-kicking team’s winning probability is 50%, either. This implies that the observed 
winning frequencies in the seasons from 1970/1971 to 2002/2003 are consistent with a random chance of the 
first-kicking team winning the shootout. We would like to thank John Wooders for drawing our attention to the 
test. 
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priori expected, i.e., in 60.5% of 129 shootouts in ten different national and international 
competitions, where the time period considered in their paper is different across competitions. 
To conclude, we think that there are two main implications from this comment: First, the 
findings and conclusions offered by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) on the 
first-mover advantage in sequential tournaments do not appear to be robust and, therefore, are 
less general than it seems at first sight. Second, taking specific subsamples without a clear and 
coherent criterion on which time periods and competitions to include could lead to non-
representative results. 
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Table and Figure 
 
 
Table 1: Shootout data for six major competitions and all seasons from 1970/1971 to 
2002/2003 
 Number of 
shootouts 
First-kicking team wins 
(relative frequency) 
p-value (two-sided 
Binomial test) 
[1] German Soccer Cup Competition† 105 0.514 0.85 
[2] European Champions League* 27 0.630 0.25 
[3] European Cup Winners’ Cup# 32 0.625 0.22 
[4] UEFA-Cup‡ 73 0.534 0.64 
[5] European Championship 9 0.333 0.51 
[6] World Cup 16 0.438 0.80 
Sum [1] – [6] 262 0.534 0.29 
Notes: 
† There are 10 more shootouts in the German Soccer Cup Competition for which we lack data on the order of 
kicks. 
* The data for this competition include its predecessor, the European Champion Clubs’ Cup, which was played 
out from 1955-1991. There is one more shootout with missing data on the kicking order. 
# This competition ceased in 1999. There are two more shootouts for which we miss data on the kicking order. 
‡ The data for this competition include its predecessor, the European Fairs Cup, which was played out from 
1955-1971. There are three more shootouts for which we miss data on the kicking order. 
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Figure 1: Relative frequency of first-kicking teams winning a shootout – data from all 
competitions combined (number of shootouts in parenthesis) 
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Abstract 
 
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts 
from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer 
penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting 
data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their 
result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not 
significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia 
and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples 
without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative 
findings. 
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